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In this paper, I challenge the view that the deceptive nature of placebo treatments creates an insur-
mountable ethical barrier to their use. I agree that placebo treatments are deceptive, and argue that 
deception is required to maximize the benefit of placebo treatments, but explain that the usual ob-
jections against deceiving patients do not apply in this special case, since placebo deception can be 
unlike other forms of clinical deception. I explain that clinical deception should only be considered 
paternalistic or coercive when it fails to serve the stated interests of the patient.
Aside from the claim that placebos are coercive, there is a range of objections to the use of place-
bos in clinical practice in the literature. I show how these remaining ethical objections pose signifi-
cant, but not insurmountable moral barriers to the clinical use of placebo. By using placebos within 
a set of coherent ethical constraints, it is possible to prescribe them in a way that maximizes patient 
benefit while preserving their autonomy and preventing them from being abused or coerced. Al-
though these constraints turn out to be extensive, I demonstrate that one very common case—de-
pression—makes it feasible to use placebo treatments within appropriate moral boundaries.
Finally, I explain how doctors should deal with a patient’s discovery of the nature of their placebo 
treatment, and I offer an argument in defence of the practice of charging patients for placebo treat-
ment.
If doctors are aware of the various constraints on their use, placebo medications can form a use-
ful treatment option for the occasional circumstances in which they can be beneficially and ethi-
cally administered.
Introduction
One of the oldest debates in medical ethics con-
cerns the deceptive prescription of pharmaco-
logically inert medicines, or ‘placebos’, to patients 
in the clinic. Doctors have long understood that 
the suffering of patients could be ameliorated by 
sham treatments, but the deceptive nature of these 
treatments — at least on its face — contravenes the 
strong prohibition against the deception of pa-
tients contained in the norms, guidelines and laws 
that constitute modern medical ethics.
In this paper I will seek to resolve the ethical 
debate over clinical placebo use by showing that 
it involves a special case of deception, which is 
not subject to the same ethical objections as other 
forms of clinical deception. There remain a num-
ber of specific objections to placebo use which 
do not relate to the general impermissibility of 
deception, but I will show that these objections 
ought to limit our use of placebos in certain ways, 
but not prohibit it entirely.
These arguments require that we first agree 
that placebos are both efficacious and decep-
tive, and that the deception is required to maxi-
mize their efficacy, so I will begin by addressing 
these issues.
Controversy over the relative 
efficacy of placebo therapies
In addition to the ethical controversy, there is 
an enduring scientific controversy over whether 
placebos are effective as a clinical treatment, and 
whether or not they can be made to work when 
the patient knows he is getting a placebo. For the 
sake of brevity, I am going to begin by assum-
ing that placebos are effective at least for relief of 
symptoms, that they are always beneficial in the 
clinic†, and that their effectiveness depends, at 
least in part, on the patient being unaware that he 
is receiving a placebo.
Whether or not these presumptions are cor-
rect is largely an empirical question. In a previ-
ous paper, I reviewed some of the available data 
(Foddy, 2009). Evidence from sources such as 
Irving Kirsch’s study presented in 2010, or Bingel’s 
recent fMRI study, give us reason to believe that 
clinical placebos can be both effective and benefi-
cial (Kirsch, 2010; Bingel et al., 2011). Yet there is 
very little in the way of direct evidence concerning 
the usefulness of placebo in the clinic, or concern-
ing the effect of deception on the magnitude of the 
placebo effect. Why is this?
The Journal of
 
† Harmful ‘nocebo’ effects 
are sometimes observed in 
a research setting, where 
patients have no positive 
expectation that the treat-
ment will work. As I have 
argued elsewhere, these 
effects are likely very rare in 
a clinical setting.
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One reason is that when placebos are given 
in a research context, it is almost always because 
researchers need to control for the placebo ef-
fect — they are not trying to elicit or maximize it. 
They tell their subjects that they will receive ei-
ther an active medication or an entirely inert one, 
and as Kirsch suggests, patients can frequently tell 
whether or not they have received a placebo be-
cause only the active medication produces side-
effects (Kirsch, 2010). For these reasons, the mag-
nitude of the placebo effect measured in clinical 
trials is certainly underestimated, though to what 
degree it is impossible to guess.
There are very few empirical studies of the 
clinical use of ‘deceptive’ placebo, wherein a doc-
tor prescribes a placebo without telling the patient 
that he may receive an inert substance. The reason 
for this is twofold: first, the deception of research 
subjects is prohibited in both medical research 
by the doctrine of informed consent.(Wear, 1998) 
Research subjects can be deceived, but they must 
give prior consent to any deception which is made 
in the course of the research. Second, the use of 
deceptive placebos is explicitly prohibited in the 
clinic, rendering the results of such studies moot 
(AMA, 2007). Since deceptive placebo use cannot 
be studied, the difference between deceptive and 
non-deceptive placebo use cannot be measured 
within the ethical guidelines governing modern 
medical research.
Aside from the difficult empirical questions 
of whether placebos are effective and whether de-
ception is required, however, there is a separate 
philosophical question concerning whether and 
when a doctor may prescribe a deceptive, albeit 
beneficial and efficacious placebo in the clinic. It 
is this question with which I am concerned in this 
paper.
Are placebos indeed decep-
tive?
In using a placebo to treat a patient, the doctor’s 
primary aim is to make her patient believe some-
thing that she believes to be true: that he will feel 
better. It is worth examining what is usually as-
sumed — that the prescription of placebo is decep-
tive. Consider the following placebo vignette:
The patient, John, has a form of viral 
conjunctivitis, for which no treatment is 
available or required. It causes pinkness 
in his eyes and an itching, uncomfortable 
sensation. His symptoms, though embar-
rassing and uncomfortable, will disappear 
after a few days. Susan, his doctor, believes 
that her patient’s felt discomfort could be 
alleviated by a placebo. She hands him a 
small unlabeled bottle of eyedrops, which 
she knows to be saline solution, and says, 
“Take these twice a day. They will not al-
leviate the pinkness of your eyes, but they 
will reduce the uncomfortable sensation 
while your immune system takes care of 
the virus.” Susan believes that what she is 
saying is true: by means of psychological 
association (the placebo effect), the drops 
will reduce John’s felt discomfort. But 
this effect demands that John strongly as-
sociates the drops with medicines he has 
received in the past. If John believes that 
the drops operate through a psychologi-
cal rather than chemical mechanism, the 
effect will be much weaker. So, in order 
that the treatment can work, Susan sim-
ply omits to tell John how she thinks the 
eye drops will work, and he does not ask 
for more information, assuming that any 
medical explanation will be beyond his 
level of understanding.
To use the formulation of Igor Primoratz, 
when we lie we make ‘a statement believed to be 
false, with the intention of getting another to ac-
cept it as true.’ (Primoratz, 1984). The only overt 
statement which Susan makes in this case is a 
statement she believes to be true. She sincerely 
predicts that taking the eye drops twice a day will 
reduce the discomfort in John’s eyes. She has not 
told a lie. 
But Susan has, in telling the truth, led John 
to hold two true beliefs and one false belief. He 
comes to believe correctly that he will feel bet-
ter, and that taking the drops will make him feel 
better, but he also now holds the false belief that 
the eye drops work through a similar mechanism 
to other eye drops he has taken. Since she delib-
erately leads him into this false belief, Susan has 
deceived John.
Is deception necessary in pla-
cebo prescription?
Patients seek out doctors expecting to have their 
diseases cured, and when that cannot be done, 
they expect to have their unwanted symptoms 
alleviated. Sometimes, the only way that the 
symptoms can be treated is through the use of 
the placebo effect (Foddy, 2009). And in order 
to harness the placebo effect, the patient needs to 
believe, at some deep level, that the treatment will 
make him feel better.
At one level, it is thoroughly rational to be-
lieve that taking a placebo will make us feel better. 
Patients ought to believe that they will feel better, 
since their goal — the alleviation of their symp-
toms — will be met, to some extent, just so long as 
they believe it will be met.
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Unfortunately, as Gibbard points out, “Beliefs 
seem like prime examples of what we can appraise 
as rational or irrational, but beliefs, like emotions, 
cannot be had or cast off at will. We may be able 
to “make believe” at will, but that is not the same 
as really believing at will” (Gibbard, 1990. p.38). 
I might believe, on reflection, that I will feel bet-
ter just so long as I believe I will feel better. But I 
cannot just make believe that I will feel better, and 
I cannot simply will myself into believing what I 
realize to be true. 
In any case, the placebo effect does not seem 
to harness a high-level, reflective expectation that 
one will feel better. Instead, it harnesses condi-
tioned associations between medicines and medi-
cal benefits (Benedetti, 2006; Colloca & Benedetti, 
2006). Because of this, it would not be enough to 
believe that I will get better through the placebo 
effect, even if I could deliberately form such a 
belief. I need to believe, sincerely, that what I am 
getting is similar to the treatments that have made 
me feel better in the past.
Clearly it is impossible to form a false belief 
such as this by oneself. An accomplice is needed. 
The accomplice must recognize and respect my 
goal — that is, to feel better — but I can never ex-
plicitly ask the accomplice to deceive me, or else 
I will not form the right kind of false belief. The 
relationship between doctor and patient is the ex-
act kind of structure which can make possible this 
type of epistemic sleight-of-hand; since the doctor 
(or some other doctor) has given me efficacious 
therapies in the past, I will associate whatever 
treatment she gives me with past pharmacologi-
cal benefits. When a doctor leads a patient into 
holding a beneficial false belief in this way, that is 
(by definition) deception.
It is possible that we can harness the uncon-
scious association between pills and benefits that 
many people have formed. Perhaps if I give my-
self a placebo, or if a doctor gives me a placebo 
openly, letting me know that she expects to elicit a 
placebo effect, it will not matter that I do not con-
sciously expect a pharmacological effect. Perhaps 
my unconscious expectation of an effect will be 
enough to produce a benefit. This suggestion is 
made by the American Medical Association in its 
policy which prohibits deceptive placebo use, and 
it was explored in one study by Park & Covi in 
1965, which is now thought to be flawed (AMA, 
2007; Park & Covi, 1965; Klein, 1994). 
A recent paper by Kaptchuk et al. provides 
newer evidence for the effectiveness of such ‘open’ 
or ‘nonblind’ placebos compared to the absence 
of treatment, but it fails to compare the effective-
ness of the open placebo to the effectiveness of 
deceptive placebo (Kaptchuk et al. 2010). In fact, 
other than Park & Covi’s flawed study, we have 
no evidence suggesting that such open placebos 
work anything like as well as deceptive placebos, 
and no evidence is likely to be forthcoming since 
it would require that researchers deceive their 
control group. 
If further evidence does appear, it may turn 
out that open placebos can be as effective as de-
ceptive placebo — that the placebo effect can be of 
full benefit even when a patient consciously be-
lieves there is no commonality between the pla-
cebo and their past, pharmacological treatments. 
Until then, given the paucity of evidence to that 
effect, we should assume what is more plausible: 
either that open placebos do not work, or that 
their effect is much more limited than the effect 
of deceptive placebo. We should assume that in 
order for a placebo treatment to provide the max-
imum benefit, the patient needs to falsely believe 
that he will get better through the action of some 
pharmacological agent.
While I cannot offer empirical proof that 
deception is required to maximize the benefi-
cial placebo effect, there is a kind of categori-
cal argument which is often used to support the 
claim that deception is not required in the use 
of placebos. This argument suggests that decep-
tion is not required because the placebo effect 
can be utilized even without deceptively giving 
an inert treatment. Part of the benefit of regu-
lar, non-deceptive therapies is that they employ 
the placebo effect, as Dan Moerman suggests in 
this issue (Moerman, 2011). The placebo effect is 
also engaged in the course of a clinical consulta-
tion, when a doctor engages with the patient and 
shows genuine concern. This effect can be maxi-
mized by maximizing the patient’s unconscious 
expectation of benefit when prescribing an active 
medication, either by verbal means or by using 
nonverbal cues (Moerman, 2011). Deception is 
not required in order to harness the placebo ef-
fect in these ways.
But we should be careful about how far we 
stretch this point; for one thing, there are many 
cases in which no efficacious medicine can be 
given (more on this below). In these cases, doc-
tors may be tempted to give ineffective but phar-
macologically active medications in the hope that 
this avoids deception while eliciting a placebo 
response (Kolber, 2008). Susan might have given 
John aspirin, for example, thinking that she could 
tell him he was receiving a medicine without de-
ceiving him. But this would be a mistake. Even 
though aspirin is a pharmacologically active 
medicine, if Susan believes it will have no benefi-
cial pharmacological effect on John’s ailment, it is 
a placebo, and it is a deceptive placebo if she leads 
him to falsely believe that he is getting a therapy 
with a significant pharmacological action. If the 
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doctor wants to harness the placebo effect using 
pills or eye drops when it is not possible to give 
a significantly effective treatment, deception will 
always be necessary.
On a dogmatic reading of the rule against 
deceiving patients, this makes the effective use of 
placebos in the clinic an impossibility. But, I will 
argue, placebos represent a special case for clini-
cal deception: a case in which it is at least pos-
sible to deceive patients without harming them 
or diminishing their autonomy. Because of this, 
doctors should be permitted to consider using 
placebo medications, even if it is true that they 
could elicit a beneficial placebo effect using bed-
side manner alone.
Is placebo deception unethi-
cal?
The prima facie presumption in medical ethics 
is that doctors should never deceive their pa-
tients in any situation. As the American Medical 
Association puts it, “A physician shall . . . be hon-
est in all professional interactions, and strive to re-
port physicians . . . engaging in fraud or deception, 
to appropriate entities.”(AMA, 2001). Jackson has 
argued that deception can be ethical so long as it 
does not involve actual lying, (Jackson, 1991) and 
Takarangi and Loftus suggest that deceptive tech-
niques could be carefully used in the clinic to di-
rectly benefit patients (Takarangi & Loftus, 2010). 
But the orthodox view is certainly that doctors 
have a duty neither to lie to, nor deceive their pa-
tients; that deception is to be avoided in its own 
right as something that is harmful to patients and 
contrary to the goals of medicine in general.
The reasoning behind this orthodox view pro-
ceeds roughly as follows: deception, if uncovered, 
undermines the trust between the patient and 
doctor and may distress the patient. Deception 
can limit a patient’s autonomy by preventing 
him from making informed medical decisions. 
Deception also diminishes the transparency of 
the medical consultation process, creating oppor-
tunities for unethical doctors to abuse the patient 
in other ways. 
However, medical practice generates a wide 
range of scenarios in which deception may be on 
balance beneficial to the patient, not only in the 
case of placebo prescription but more frequently 
in cases where a diagnosis is made that would be 
exceedingly distressing to a patient.
As Daniel Sokol has pointed out, the demands 
of compassion can sometimes overwhelm the 
presumption against deceiving patients (Sokol, 
2007). If a clinical deception can be consid-
ered compassionate — that is, if it can reliably be 
expected to reduce anxiety or stress, if the decep-
tion is likely to succeed and if these goals cannot 
be met without deception, then that deception 
may be morally justified.
There certainly may be cases where placebo 
deception is justified on the grounds that it is suf-
ficiently compassionate relative to the moral costs 
of deceiving patients. However, I do not wish 
to advance an ‘all things considered’ defence of 
placebo deception. Instead, I wish to argue that, 
so long as it is limited in the right way, placebo 
deception is a special case in which the usual pre-
sumption against the deception of patients ought 
to be suspended.
Placebo deception as a special 
case
When a doctor gives us a placebo, we are deceived 
into believing something which will become true 
the moment it is believed: that we will feel better. 
Placebo is just one of a range of cases which 
bear this property. Perhaps the most mundane 
example are the cases of encouragement and trust.
Encouragement:
Imagine you are practicing a speech for 
your son’s wedding, and that I am famous 
for my excellent wedding toasts. Listening 
to you, I realize that you are doing a ter-
rible job, but that most of your difficulty 
seems to come from a lack of confidence. 
I tell you the speech will be very well re-
ceived, hoping to persuade you that your 
preparation is going well. You gain con-
fidence from my encouragement, and as 
a result the speech is well-received. My 
deceptive prediction is made true, just so 
long as you believe in my sincerity.
Trust:
A and B are strangers who have been 
forced to participate together in a coop-
erative task. A does not much like the 
look of B, and expects B to sabotage the 
job for his own benefit. B feels the much 
same about A, and so neither holds high 
hopes for the success of the project. 
However, both believe that if they could 
just forge a relationship of mutual trust, 
the other would cooperate. To achieve 
this, A untruthfully says ‘I trust you. I 
know you will do your half of the work.’ 
Now B believes that A will cooperate, and 
he is willing to cooperate himself. A’s un-
truthful statement is made true, just so 
long as B believes it.
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Earlier, I said that we cannot will ourselves 
to believe in these beneficial beliefs on our own. 
Nevertheless, it would be rational for us to believe 
them, since believing makes them true. In the 
case of placebo prescription, the doctor deceives 
the patient into one false belief in order to per-
suade him into holding a true belief. This is the 
property which makes it possible for the decep-
tive use of placebos to be carried out within the 
ethical boundaries of medical practice.
In such cases, the doctor’s ends justify her de-
ceptive means, provided the following conditions 
are met: First, the false belief must be required in 
order to gain the true belief — otherwise, honesty 
could achieve the same ends. Second, the true 
belief must be genuinely beneficial to the patient. 
Finally, this benefit must be assessed by the pa-
tient, in terms of his own endorsed ends, rather 
than on some objective basis by the doctor. For 
example, my doctor may think that it would ben-
efit me to be vaccinated against measles, but that 
would not justify his vaccinating me without my 
knowledge, unless I have asked to be vaccinated, 
either explicitly or implicitly (say, by visiting a 
vaccination booth and rolling up my sleeve).
It is important to note that this third require-
ment will normally be upheld in the case of pla-
cebo prescription, provided that the patient has 
voluntarily sought the assistance of the doctor re-
garding the alleviation of some set of symptoms, 
and provided that the doctor assures the patient 
that it is only those symptoms that will be allevi-
ated. When a patient comes to the doctor com-
plaining of some malady, we can reasonably infer 
that they want their symptoms to be treated.
It is certainly true that deception prevents 
a patient from giving fully informed consent. 
Sometimes it is objected that the doctor acts pa-
ternalistically in conferring a benefit upon the 
patient without his consent, whether the patient 
in fact desires that benefit or not. The American 
Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs, for example, holds the view that 
since patients cannot be fully informed regarding 
deceptive placebo treatments, these treatments 
will always be paternalistic and hence unethical 
(Shah & Goold, 2009). But this objection reveals 
an exceedingly dogmatic and inflexible under-
standing of the nature of the relationships be-
tween paternalism and consent. 
A patient is only treated paternalistically if the 
doctor confers on him a benefit which he did not 
request. Paternalism frustrates the stated goals of 
the patient in order to promote some other goal 
that the doctor has judged more important. But 
if the patient, either explicitly or implicitly, de-
mands that his symptoms be alleviated, then there 
is no way that it can be paternalistic for the doctor 
to try to meet these goals. Along similar lines, if 
an addict asks that his friend confiscate his drugs, 
it cannot be paternalistic to confiscate them. In 
light of the addict’s request, his friend respects his 
autonomy in taking the drugs, rather than violat-
ing it.
It is true that the patient has not given consent 
(either implicit or explicit) to be deceived about 
the mechanism of his treatment. He has also not 
explicitly consented to be given placebo. In this 
sense a deceptive treatment violates the doctrine 
of informed consent. But does this matter? Once 
a doctor receives a patient’s consent to treat some 
ailment, she is not required to obtain separate 
consent for each step of the treatment process. So 
long as none of the steps involves any significant 
cost or harm to the patient, she may execute the 
treatment however she sees fit. It is not paternal-
istic for a doctor to unilaterally select an electron-
ic rather than alcohol-based thermometer, or to 
choose one brand of aspirin over another. We do 
not require patients to explicitly consent to have 
their temperature measured with a digital ther-
mometer, because it is not reasonable to expect 
that his goals will be frustrated when the doctor 
unilaterally decides to use one.
Choices of this kind cannot frustrate the aims 
of the patient or cause harm. By the same token, if 
the doctor decides to advance the patient’s stated 
interests by leading him into a false belief about 
the nature of his treatment, she does not frustrate 
his goals or make him any worse off.
A limitation
There is an exception to this defense, however, 
whenever there is a real medical alternative to 
the placebo. If there is a meaningful choice that 
the patient might make between one therapy and 
another, the deceptive prescription of placebo 
frustrates the patient’s ability to make this choice. 
In such cases, it is certainly paternalistic for the 
doctor to use deception to force the patient to ac-
cept one reasonable option (the placebo) at the 
expense of another.
It is therefore a strict moral requirement that 
placebos are only ever prescribed deceptively 
when there is no alternative treatment which any 
reasonable patient might choose. If doctors ad-
here to this requirement, the patient cannot be a 
victim of paternalism and his autonomy will be 
preserved. This requirement also guarantees that 
the patient does not miss out on optimal medical 
care.
This requirement places a serious constraint 
on the ethical use of placebos. To take one ob-
vious example, a doctor should never prescribe 
placebo for a harmless headache, if there are 
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analgesics available which the patient might rea-
sonably prefer. Doctors must be limited to pre-
scribing placebo when the symptom to be treated 
is otherwise untreatable.
It is not all bad news for the placebo-prescrib-
ing doctor, however. Placebos can still be used to 
treat untreatable symptoms of treatable ailments. 
A patient with a treatable ear infection causing 
untreatable nausea, for example, could be given 
antibiotics for the infection and placebo for the 
nausea.
This is the first and most important of a num-
ber of important considerations which must con-
strain the prescription of placebos if they are to 
be employed in an ethically defensible way. In 
the next section, I consider the other major con-
straints on placebo prescription.
Other limitations on placebo 
deception
There remain four reasonable objections which 
are frequently made against the deceptive use of 
placebos, and these objections circumscribe the 
ethical limits of placebo prescription. 
The first set of objections relates to cases of 
misdiagnosis. Suppose Susan has misdiagnosed 
John, thinking that he has untreatable viral con-
junctivitis when he actually has a form of bacterial 
conjunctivitis that can be treated with antibiotics.
When a doctor sends a patient away with 
placebos, the patient may wrongly believe that 
his doctor understands his condition. He may be 
less likely to seek a second opinion from a more 
competent doctor, even if his condition worsens. 
He may also unwittingly mislead the second doc-
tor about the ‘medications’ he is currently taking 
(Kolber, 2009). Thus, the doctor’s misdiagnosis 
may mean that he misses out on an effective ther-
apy, and her deception can make it much harder 
for him to obtain that therapy than the misdiag-
nosis would on its own.
Now, it is important to note that in the case 
I described at the outset, John is only told to ex-
pect relief of discomfort; he is not told to expect 
underlying symptoms or disease to be cured. 
Because of this, if his condition worsens he will 
not be prevented from seeking a second consul-
tation or a second opinion from a different doc-
tor. In this respect John is no worse off than any 
other patient whose doctor has made the wrong 
diagnosis.
For some illnesses, however, the divide be-
tween symptoms and disease will not be anything 
like as clear as it is in the case of Susan and John. 
In these cases, it may be wiser not to use the pla-
cebos at all. 
The second set of objections concerns cases 
where the consulting doctor is unable to make 
any firm diagnosis at all — perhaps the most com-
mon case where a doctor might be tempted to 
prescribe placebo. In these cases it is still true that 
no active treatment can be ethically prescribed, 
but it might not be true that no active treatment 
is available to treat the underlying, undiagnosed 
ailment. 
In these cases, a similar objection appears: 
placebo prescription requires the doctor to mis-
lead the patient into believing that a diagnosis has 
been made. If a patient is given placebo, he will be 
much less likely to revisit his doctor if new symp-
toms arise which might enable a positive diagno-
sis (Powell & Bailey, 2009).
These cases are more ethically complex than 
the cases in which the malady is understood but 
no treatment is available. But there is still a way to 
prescribe placebo in these cases. The doctor can 
prescribe placebo and protect the patient’s ability 
to obtain the best medical care by saying some-
thing like this:
I do not have enough information to diag-
nose your illness, but here are some pills which 
will help to alleviate your discomfort. If you de-
velop any new symptoms, please come for a fol-
low-up examination.
Pain, discomfort, nausea, anxiety and similar 
symptoms cannot be misdiagnosed or undiag-
nosable. If the patient reports feeling pain, then 
the pain is a candidate for treatment by placebo.
Of course, if the patient’s only symptoms are 
those which might be alleviated by placebo, such 
as headache, nausea, or anxiety, then this strategy 
will interfere with the diagnosis of the patient, 
creating a risk that a positive diagnosis will be 
delayed or prevented. In such cases, the doctor 
should avoid using placebo. 
The third set of objections concerns the abuse 
of placebo prescription by unethical doctors. 
Doctors may be tempted to use placebos to rid 
themselves of troublesome patients, or to increase 
the number of patients they can treat. This worry 
is explicitly mentioned in the American Medical 
Association’s decision prohibiting the use of pla-
cebo (AMA, 2007). In these cases, it is thoroughly 
unethical for the doctor to prescribe a placebo. 
As I argued above, part of the reason why 
placebo prescription is a special type of deception 
is that the patient is deceived for his own ends, 
which he declares either explicitly or implicitly 
when he visits the doctor and asks to be treated. 
But in cases where the doctor wants to get rid of 
the patient for the sake of efficiency or conve-
nience, the doctor’s ends differ from the ends of 
the patient.
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If the doctor deceives the patient for reasons 
which are at odds with the patient’s goals, then the 
deception becomes coercive. Onora O’Neill puts 
it this way:
Victims may want the same ends as their co-
ercers; but that is not the same as sharing those 
ends, for one who is coerced, even if pointlessly, 
is not pursuing, nor therefore sharing, ends at all 
(O’Neill, 1985, p.113).
If the doctor leads the patient to walk away 
happily with some inert substance, the patient is 
not sharing the doctor’s goal: that he disappear. 
The doctor has coerced her patient into leaving 
without being treated, satisfying her own goals 
but not the patient’s.
Another reasonable objection against the 
clinical placebo is that, if the use of placebo be-
comes too widespread, its effectiveness will di-
minish, since patients will develop less of an asso-
ciation between taking medicines and benefiting 
from their pharmacological actions. If this is true, 
then the widespread use of placebos would also 
diminish the benefit of active medications, which 
after all employ the placebo effect as part of their 
mechanism. 
In a similar vein, it may be suggested that the 
widespread use of placebos would undermine the 
background level of trust between patients and 
doctors in every consultation, leading patients to 
suspect that every medicine is inert, even if they 
agree that it is sometimes appropriate for doctors 
to prescribe inert medications. This could make 
it harder to deceive patients, and — again — could 
undermine the effectiveness of active medications 
as well as placebos. 
Whether or not any of these threats are real is 
a largely empirical question — a question which, 
like all the other empirical questions surrounding 
placebo use, will be very difficult to investigate 
within current research ethics guidelines. But it 
is worth pointing out that placebos will never be 
all that widely used if they are used only within 
the constraints I have outlined here. Placebos will 
be a treatment option which is never preferred 
when better options are available. And we can 
mitigate these risks even more if we are careful 
to avoid practical pitfalls in our methods of pla-
cebo prescription. For example, doctors should be 
discouraged from ‘debriefing’ patients once their 
condition improves, revealing their use of decep-
tive placebo.
What to do when pushed
There is one more objection to the use of decep-
tive placebos that imposes a constraint on how 
they are used: namely, that the use of placebos 
may undermine the important relationship of 
trust between the doctor and the patient (Kanaan, 
2009).
Indeed, there are cases in which the particular 
relationship of trust between individual doctors 
and their patients may be undermined if place-
bos are prescribed in the wrong way. While the 
initial placebo deception is a special case which 
ought not to be considered unethical, it remains 
unethical for doctors to engage in non-placebo 
deceptions. 
Unfortunately, these kinds of inessential de-
ceptions can quickly creep in if a patient asks di-
rectly whether or not they are receiving a placebo. 
Suppose, for example, that the patient makes 
a specific enquiry about the nature of his treat-
ment after the doctor has provided a placebo. Or 
suppose he asks the name of his treatment. Most 
patients have no interest in the exact pharmaco-
logical mechanism of their treatment, but some 
inevitably do ask such questions. What is the doc-
tor to do in these cases?
Imagine John asks Susan about the active in-
gredient in the eye drops he has been given. Susan 
is faced here with a choice: she can either admit 
that the eye drops are inert, or she can create a 
new deception, and tell John that the drops con-
tain (for example) an antiviral agent or a steroid. 
If John tells another doctor that he is on steroids, 
she may refuse to prescribe John the optimal 
treatment for some other ailment. 
Now, Susan could avoid this outcome by 
telling John truthfully that the drops contain an 
active ingredient, salt, that is commonly used to 
treat eye-related symptoms in infants. In doing 
this, she would avoid lying, but succeed in deceiv-
ing John into holding the belief that the treatment 
is pharmacologically active and indicated for his 
symptoms. If he visits another doctor, that doc-
tor will realize that John has been given a placebo. 
While this is better than directly lying to the pa-
tient, there is another important objection: Even 
if Susan never lies about what the eye drops con-
tained, if John discovers that the drops are not in-
dicated for his adult conjunctivitis, he will know 
that Susan further deceived him in order to pro-
tect her original placebo deception. 
Doctors need to be able to recognize the point 
where further deception would not fall under the 
moral umbrella of placebo deception. The initial 
deception involved in placebo prescription is per-
missible because it furthers the patient’s stated 
aims, but it is not clear that subsequent support-
ing deceptions advance the patient’s aims at all; 
they merely serve to cover the doctor’s tracks. As 
I argued above, if a deception serves the doctor’s 
aims and not the patient’s, it is coercive. Susan 
60 || MBR || Volume : 1 || Issue : 2














should not be so desperate to defend her initial 
deception that she engages in additional coercive, 
non-beneficial deceptions. She should tell John 
something like this:
I had prescribed you a placebo, but now that 
you know about it there will be no beneficial pla-
cebo effect. We’ll have to rely on your natural ca-
pacity for healing instead.
Patients may be embarrassed or angry to dis-
cover that they have been deceived by their doc-
tors, so these situations ought to be avoided as far 
as possible. While the patient may prefer to avoid 
embarrassment, this is not an aim he expresses 
in seeking out a doctor, and it will be a case of 
unethical paternalism if he is protected from an 
uncomfortable confrontation for the sake of his 
own tranquility.
Placebo for Depression
Perhaps my arguments so far have created the 
impression that placebos can only be used in the 
rarest of clinical scenarios. It is true that the con-
straints I have mentioned greatly limit the range 
of cases in which a doctor could prescribe pla-
cebo to a patient. But the ethical hurdles can be 
surmounted in one of the most familiar clinical 
presentations: the depressed patient.
Kirsch suggests both that modern anti-de-
pressants are exceedingly effective and that their 
effectiveness is entirely grounded in the placebo 
effect (Kirsch, 2010). If this is correct, then there 
is a multi-billion dollar industry in the produc-
tion and prescription of placebos — and while the 
clinicians in question certainly do not intend to 
prescribe placebos, the unintentional nature of 
their actions makes no practical difference to the 
patients. 
If we conceive of depression as a symptom 
rather than a disease, a doctor will satisfy all the 
ethical requirements I have given for the decep-
tive use of placebo when she gives placebo to a 
depressed patient. I said that placebos should 
only be given when there is no reasonable alterna-
tive, and if Kirsch’s results are correct then all the 
competing pharmacological treatments should 
be considered placebos*. I also said that placebo 
should be presented as an agent of symptomatic 
relief rather than as a cure, and I see no reason 
why placebo could not be prescribed in this way 
to a depressed patient. A doctor might say:
I do not know why you are depressed — mod-
ern medicine does not understand depression 
very well. It could be that you have a chemical 
imbalance or it could be due to stress in your 
life. Trials have found that 60% of patients feel 
significantly better when they take an antidepres-
sant, so that is what I am prescribing for you. If 
your depression gets worse, or if you develop new 
symptoms, come see me again.
Depression is a common ailment which plac-
es a very heavy burden on our society. Currently, 
assuming Kirsch is correct, doctors currently 
prescribe placebos for this ailment: expensive 
placebos with serious unwanted side-effects. We 
also prescribe these placebos in a way which en-
tirely ignores all the moral limitations I have de-
scribed — we give patients antidepressants when 
we could easily send them to therapy or prescribe 
exercise, we tell patients we are treating the ail-
ment rather than the symptoms, and we overuse 
the placebo in a way which probably is dimin-
ishing its effectiveness. But prescribed correctly, 
depression provides the clearest case for allowing 
doctors to intentionally and responsibly prescribe 
placebos in the clinic.
The ethics of charging mon-
ey for inert therapies
Placebo treatments have repeatedly been shown 
to be more powerful when larger prices are im-
posed on the patients who pay for them (Waber 
et al. 2008). When people perceive more value in 
something simply because it has a higher price, 
it is hard to shake the feeling that they have been 
duped. And so it is sometimes objected that there 
is something unethical about expecting patients 
to pay for inert medications. This objection, how-
ever, does not hold up under close scrutiny, at 
least when it comes to placebo treatments.
Consider first that even active medications 
have a large placebo component. This is illustrat-
ed very clearly by the recent study of Bingel et al. 
which showed that the effectiveness of a powerful 
opiate analgesic was reduced by more than 50% 
when the patient was unaware it had been admin-
istered, and subsequently reduced by nearly 100% 
when the patient was (falsely) informed that the 
analgesic had been withdrawn (Bingel et al. 2011). 
If a drug’s action is 50% placebo, or 80% placebo, 
we do not insist that the vendors of these drugs 
reduce their prices by a corresponding amount. 
Consider too that we frequently prescribe 
medications for which the mechanism is poorly 
understood, or not understood at all — at best, we 
have some evidence that these medicines provide 
benefit compared to an open research placebo, 
but no evidence for what that benefit is or why 
the medicine provides it. Thus there is no factual 
basis for the suggestion that we are normally con-
fined to selling medicines that are known to have 
a specific pharmacological action. Many drugs on 
the market could (for all we know) have an en-
tirely psychological mechanism.
 
* Perhaps a depressed 
patient could more fruitfully 
be prescribed exercise or 
meditation than placebo. 
Even if that is true, there will 
be very many cases where 
this is not feasible, either be-
cause the depressed patient 
is already getting regular 
exercise or because they are 
unable to exercise.
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In this light, it should be clear that we could 
only object to the sale of placebo treatments if we 
thought that placebo benefits were in some sense 
false benefits. But that cannot be correct, since 
placebos provide symptomatic relief: something 
for which patients will willingly and happily pay.
Conclusions
The ethical use of deceptive placebos requires 
doctors to walk a fine line both medically and 
morally. They must first ensure that placebo gen-
uinely is the only reasonable treatment available 
for treating the patient’s symptoms. They must 
make it very clear to the patient that they are only 
treating the felt symptoms of the ailment, and not 
the underlying complaint. And most importantly, 
they must ensure that their ends in deceiving the 
patient are always shared by the patient, in order 
that their use of placebo will not be paternalistic 
and coercive. 
Meeting all these needs simultaneously is 
surely a demanding task, but I doubt that it is 
too demanding for skilled doctors. The benefits, 
meanwhile, are significant: there are a large num-
ber of cases in which no treatment can be offered 
or in which no diagnosis can be made. Provided 
that placebos are as effective at treating symptoms 
like pain and nausea as I have assumed that they 
are, the medical and moral difficulties involved in 
the ethical use of placebo are costs that are worth 
bearing. We should allow doctors to use placebo, 
within appropriate ethical constraints.
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